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3Detect	and	Avoid
• Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) will share airspace with manned 
aircraft
• Detect and Avoid (DAA) system for UAS replaces human “see and avoid” 
• RTCA has completed Phase I Minimum Operational Performance 
Standards (MOPS) for DAA
• The MOPS targets UAS that can carry large and high-power sensor 
systems and operate in non-terminal areas
• Phase II work will extend to additional operations and UAS categories
NASA’s Ikhana UAS
4DAA	Well	Clear	
• A DAA system keeps the UAS “Well Clear” of other aircraft
• UAS is assumed to be on instrument flight rules (IFR)
• A DAA Well Clear (DWC) zone must 
o be large enough to mitigate collision risks
o be small enough to minimize operational impacts
• Traffic Collision Avoidance System II (TCAS II)
o UAS can equip TCAS II as a safety net when DAA fails
o DWC definition in Phase I MOPS driven largely by TCAS II 
interoperability
o DWC should ideally enclose TCAS II’s alerting zone
5DWC Definition (Phase I)
• DWC
o h: altitude difference 
o HMD: Horizontal miss distance (at closest point of approach)
o τmod: modified tau, a horizontal time metric 
• DWC is violated when all three variables fall below their respective 
thresholds (* represents threshold)
*
6Horizontal Miss Distance
• r: relative position of intruder
• 𝐫:̇ relative velocity of intruder
• HMD: predicted distance at horizontal 
closest point of approach (CPA)
• (predicted) Time to CPA 
tcpa = −𝒓'?̇??̇?'?̇?r
r
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7Modified Tau
• Tau 𝜏 = − ))̇ “estimates” tcpa
r is range?̇? is range rate
o Advantage: easy to compute, uses only range information
o Limitation: shows no urgency for close, almost parallel flights
• Modified Tau: all intruders within a range of 𝐷,-. are treated with highest 
urgency
For DWC, 𝐷,-. = HMD ∗	= 4000 ft𝜏,-. 	−> 	𝜏 when 𝐷,-. −>0
• DWC uses 𝜏,-. because TCAS II also uses 𝜏,-.
• DAA alerting requirements use 𝜏,-. too
𝜏,-.=7− )89:;<=8))̇ , if 𝑟 > 𝐷,-.																				0, if 𝑟 ≤ 𝐷,-.
8Example of Modified Tau
Non-accelerating intruders
v is relative to the UAS
HMD = 0
• 𝜏,-. approaches tcpa when v->∞τmod=50.6 sect cpa=60 secv=100 kt
τ
mod
=59.6 sec
t cpa=60 sec
v=500 kt
UAS
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9Limitations of Modified Tau
• 𝜏,-.
o does not correspond to a physical event 
o does not change linearly with time
• Example: For a co-altitude, head-on encounter, 𝜏,-. = 75 sec now. 
o How long until the ownship loses Well Clear (𝜏,-.*= 35 sec) ? 
o Answer is NOT 40 sec
• For alerting, prioritization of intruders using 𝜏,-. lacks physical basis
o 𝜏,-.	is neither the time to CPA nor the time to the 𝐷,-. disk
o Dependency on relative speed 
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Another Example of Modified Tau
τ
mod
=56.4 sec
t
disk
=41.3 sec
v=100 kt
τ
mod
=45.5sec
t
disk
=41.3 sec
v=500 kt
UAS
Non-accelerating intruders
v is relative to the UAS
HMD = 0𝑡CDEF: time to the 𝐷GHC disk
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Time to Protected Zone
• This work proposes the Time to Protected Zone, tpz
• tpz has advantages over	𝜏,-.
o Corresponds to a physical event
o Is linear with time
o Intruder prioritization by an alerting algorithm using tpz has a physical basis
• tpz is also suitable for DAA interoperability with TCAS II
• Same framework for both DWC and alerting algorithm
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Time to Protected Zone for DWC
• tpz: time to Protected Zone
o is the time to the disk (𝑡CDEF)
o or tcpa if not entering disk
o or 0 if already inside disk
• tcpa a special case in which 𝑅J = 0
• Interoperability with TCAS II
o tpz≤ 𝜏,-. if	𝑅J = 𝐷GHC
o DWC with tpz instead of 𝜏,-. using 
the same threshold (35 sec) is larger
o Maintains DWC/TCAS boundary
• Example: set 𝑅J = HMD ∗	= 4000 ft
r
r
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protected zone
R0
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Example of Time to Protected Zone
Non-accelerating intruders
v is relative to the ownship
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t pz=36.3(sec)
τmod=50.6 sec
t cpa=60 sec
v=100 kt
t pz=55.3 (sec)
τmod=59.6 sec
t
cpa
=60 sec
v=500 kt
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DAA Alerting
• The Protected zone can have an 
additional buffer to account for 
surveillance noise and reduce missed 
alerts
• Alert is issued if intruder is predicted to 
enter the protected zone
• Buffer size can be a function of 
individual intruders’ equipage
o ADS-B out
o Mode S/C
o Unequipped
r
r
.
y^
x^
entry to
protected zone
(HMD*, 0)
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Sensitivity of tpz to Sensor Errors
• Compared to 𝜏,-., tpz is potentially more sensitive to surveillance sensor 
errors, because it depends on heading measurements.
• Analysis of simulated encounters with realistic sensor errors
• Results show sensitivity of tpz is comparable to that of 𝜏,-.
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Relative Speed
Pr - probability of reversal of a time metric during the progression of an non-
accelerating encounter
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Conclusions
• A new time metric called Time to Protected Zone, tpz is proposed for use in 
UAS’s Detect and Avoid (DAA) systems. 
• Three advantages over modified tau, 𝜏,-.
o It corresponds to a physical event
o It is linear with real time during progression of an encounter
o Prioritization of intruders by tpz has a physical basis
• For alerting, the protected zone can be defined to be a function of surveillance 
errors to provide potentially better alerting performance. 
• Sensitivities of 𝜏,-.	and tpz to surveillance noises are comparable.
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Future Work
• RTCA Phase II MOPS
• Alerting performance 
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Intruder Prioritization
• tcpa predicts intruder 3 as the highest threat
• 𝜏,-. predicts intruder 1 as the highest threat
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Intr 1: tcpa(t = 0) = 85 sec, v = 50 kts
Intr 2: tcpa(t = 0) = 80 sec, v = 80 kts
Intr 3: tcpa(t = 0) = 75 sec, v = 500 kts
𝜏,-. (sec)
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Intruder Prioritization
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Intr 4: tpz(t = 0) = 75 sec, v = 50 kts
Intr 5: tpz(t = 0) = 80 sec, v = 120 kts
Intr 6: tpz(t = 0) = 85 sec, v = 500 kts
• tpz predicts intruder 4 as the highest threat
• 𝜏,-. predicts intruder 6 as the highest threat
𝜏,-. (sec)
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Modified Tau for DWC
• DWC uses 𝜏,-. because TCAS II also uses 𝜏,-.
• 𝜏,-. is range-based and therefore not sensitive to TCAS’s poor bearing 
sensor measurements
• Even with the use of 𝜏,-.,	DWC cannot completely enclose TCAS II resolution 
advisory zone due to complicated alerting logic in TCAS that
o does not use HMD consistently
o has altitude-dependent thresholds
o uses slant range 𝜏,-. (DWC uses horizontal 𝜏,-.)
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Sensitivity of tpz to Sensor Errors
• Compared to 𝜏,-., tpz is potentially more sensitive to surveillance sensor 
errors, because it depends on heading measurements.
o Fluctuating values may cause the alert type to vary back and forth
o Inaccurate values may advance or delay the onset of an alert
• Analysis of simulated encounters with modeled realistic surveillance errors to 
quantify the sensitivity
• Sensitivity metrics - lower is better
o Pr - probability of reversal of a time metric during the progression of an non-
accelerating encounter
o |∆|avg - average absolute error of a time metric as a result of surveillance 
errors
o Both metrics are zero in the absence of surveillance errors
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Test Matrix
• 972 encounters in total
• Intruder has a constant velocity
• Relative heading of 0 deg means a head-on
Parameter Value
Intruder Equipage ADS-B, Mode-S, Mode-C, None
Relative Speed (kts) 100, 300, 500
HMD (ft) 0, 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000
Relative Altitude (ft) -500, 0, 500
Relative Heading (deg) 0, 45, 90
Passing in front, behind (if HMD > 0)
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Surveillance Sensor Errors
• Sensor models are validated by flight test data
o ADS-B: accurate position and velocity
o Active surveillance for Mode S and Mode C: accurate range and altitude, 
noisy bearing
o Air-to-air radar: accurate range and bearing
• Tracker (Honeywell Tracking System): a multi-intruder, multi-sensor fusion 
system
o Data association
o Track management
o Track estimation
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Equipage-Specific Protected Zone
For this work, the buffer zone width (blue) 
increases linearly from 0 at y = R0 to ∆H at 
y = 0
∆H : intruder equipage dependent
Benchmark values
∆H0 = 900 ft for ADS-B intruders
1700 ft for mode-S and mode-C
1900 ft for unequipped intruder
Simulations use 0, 1, 2, and 3 times of ∆H0
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Aggregate Results
• Pr - probability of reversal of a time metric during the progression of an non-accelerating 
encounter
• |∆|avg - average absolute error of a time metric as a result of surveillance errors
When ∆H /∆H0=1,𝝉𝒎𝒐𝒅	and tpz have small 
differences in 
sensitivity (14% Pr, 5% 
|∆|avg). Likely not 
significant enough to 
impact alerting 
performance
∆H /∆H0
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Relative Speed
δt ≈	𝑡 σP) + σṖ)̇ ∝ S)̇
Since the 2nd term dominates and σ)̇ is constant for ADS-B and radar
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Intruder Equipage
Equipage
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